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PARTICULATE POLLUTION AND THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 
John Warren Kindt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, the Reagan Administration rejected the conclusions of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) and refused to support the work produced at 
UNCLOS III. This action of the Reagan Administration was 
prompted primarily by the perceived inequalities of the legal 
authority governing deep seabed mining. While access to the 
wealth of the ocean was considered in danger, the environmental 
aspects of obtaining this ocean wealth were largely forgotten. It is 
these environmental issues which need to be remembered and are 
the subject of this analysis. 
This article will examine how UNCLOS III responded to the 
threat of particulate pollution from deep seabed mining. The 
context in which these environmental considerations arose will 
first be analyzed by reviewing the different techniques and plans 
for mining the deep seabed. In this context, the environmental 
problems involving particulate pollution from deep seabed mining 
will be discussed. 
Thereafter, the major issue of particulate pollution will be ex-
amined within the basic parameters of the decision model estab-
lished by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. The viewpoint 
will be that of a policy-oriented decision-maker who identifies with 
the entire international community instead of a particular inter-
est group. As part of this decision-making process, this article will 
apply the McDougaVLasswell model, focusing on: 
* Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; B.A., 1972, William & Mary; 
J.D. 1976, M.B.A. 1977, University of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, University of 
Virginia. Copyright 1985 by John Warren Kindt. 
273 
274 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:273 
a. delimitation of problems; 
b. clarification of goals (the "normative" or "value task"); 
c. historical background (the "historical task"); 
d. trends and conditioning factors (the "scientific task"); and 
e. policy alternatives and recommendations (the "policy 
task").! 
This analysis should reveal some new aspects of the traditional 
issues involving deep seabed mining. Specifically, it should be-
come obvious that there are potentially serious environmental 
problems associated with deep seabed exploitation. During 
UNCLOS III, these problems did not receive the attention which 
they deserved. Accordingly, the provisions negotiated at 
UNCLOS III need to be interpreted broadly to provide environ-
mental protection for the common heritage of mankind. The utili-
zation of the McDougal/Lasswell model assists in formulating an 
interpretation of how economic and environmental considerations 
can be balanced. It will be realized that the common heritage can 
be protected from the despoliation of deep seabed exploitation 
while still allowing the development of ocean wealth. 
II. DEEP SEABED MINING AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
PARTICULATE POLLUTION 
Before utilizing the McDougal/Lasswell model in reaching the 
conclusion that a balance can be achieved between economic and 
environmental issues, it is necessary to review particulate pollu-
tion in detail. After discussing the source of particulate pollution, 
this article will review various studies which have outlined how 
particulate pollution, through deep seabed mining, poses a threat 
to the ocean environment. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re-
sources Act will then be discussed as one response to this problem. 
Deep seabed mining is utilized to exploit many different min-
eral resources, including manganese nodules, phosphorite 
nodules, and hot-brine pools, which contain high concentrations of 
metals such as gold and platinum. The mining of these resources 
causes a variety of environmental effects, including what is com-
1 McDougal & Schneider, The Protection of the Environment and World Public Order: 
Some Recent Developments, 45 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1087 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
McDougal]. For a description and analysis of problems involving manganese nodules, see 
U.S. DEP'T COM., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., 1 DEEP SEABED MINING: FINAL 
PROGRAMMATIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT xv (1981) [hereinafter cited as SEABED 
EIS]; Glassner, The Illusory Treasure of Davy Jones' Locker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533 
(1976). 
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monly known as "particulate pollution." While the term "particu-
late pollution" is often used to describe generally the environmen-
tal effects of deep seabed mining, it can be defined as ocean 
sediments and other matter which remain suspended in the 
water column as a result of deep seabed mining or continental 
shelf dredging. 
Of the various resources which are mined from the ocean floor, 
manganese nodules provide a classic illustration of how mining 
results in particulate pollution. Appearing as small (1.0 to 20 
centimeters), potato-shaped chunks of metal ore that litter many 
areas of the deep ocean floor, manganese nodules present a tech-
nologically and economically feasible source of manganese, cop-
per, nickel and cobalt.2 While manganese nodules contain some 27 
elements in varying proportions, copper and nickel are those with 
the greatest immediate value.3 The most economically promising 
area for their mining is an east-west belt in the east central 
Pacific Ocean, just south of Hawaii. The size of this area is approx-
imately 13 million square km4 (3.8 million square mi).5 As an 
abundant and valuable resource, manganese nodules could sat-
isfy a significant portion of world demand for not only copper and 
nickel, but also manganese and cobalt. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, both international consortia and 
individual nations recognized the potential profit of deep seabed 
mining and commenced environmental studies. The manganese 
nodules in the central Pacific became the subject of the Deep 
Ocean Mining Environment Study (DOMES).6 This preliminary 
environmental study formed the basis of many of the scientific 
findings presented in the Final Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement on Deep Seabed Mining (Seabed EIS).7 The 
Seabed EIS was completed by the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) pursuant to its authority under 
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (Seabed Resources 
2 See generally NAT'L ACAD. SCI., MINING IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN 
THE DEEP OCEAN 69-92 (1975); G. MANGONE, MARINE POllCY FOR AMERICA 185-92 (1977). 
3 Glassner, supra note 1, at 535. 
4 Nat'l Acad. Sci., supra note 2, at 69. 
5 Glassner, supra note 1, at 535. 
6 Generally, DOMES is also used to refer collectively to two reports: U.S. DEP'T COM., 
NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., PROJECT DEVELOPMENT PLAN: DOMES DEEP 
OCEAN MINING ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY [hereinafter cited as DOMES DEEP OCEAN 
MINING ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY (1977) [hereinafter cited as DOMES TECHNICAL PLAN]. 
7 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 6. 
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Act)8-legislation passed by Congress in 1980 to create stability of 
investment at a time when the international response to deep 
seabed mining was perceived to be adverse to U.S. interests. By 
comparison, DOMES was a cooperative NOAA/industry research 
effort conducted between 1975 and 1981.9 
While these environmental studies were occurring, industry 
began investing in deep seabed mining. By the late 1970s, ocean 
mining technology had advanced to the point where consortia 
from several developed nations were prepared to proceed with 
deep seabed mining.!O In 1981, the deep sea mining industry con-
sisted of six international consortia, four of which included U.S. 
companies as members. These international consortia engaged in 
testing engineering systems, exploring potential sites and collect-
ing environmental data. Under licenses from NOAA, the various 
consortia engaged in exploration and research toward commer-
cial mining, which was authorized by the NOAA to commence 
after January 1, 1988. NOAA required that mining by U.S. com-
panies could occur only after permits were obtained and after 
companies complied with applicable laws and regulations.1I 
Years of research yielded various methods of mining man-
ganese nodules on the deep seabed. The three basic techniques 
developed to recover this resource include: (1) air lift pumping 
(ALP), which uses compressed air to vacuum nodules off the 
ocean floor and bring them to the surface through a pipe; (2) 
hydraulic dredging (HD), which substitutes water pressure for 
the ALP system of compressed air to lift nodules to the mining 
ship on the surface; and (3) continuous line bucket (CLB) dredg-
ing, which is a simple technique using a continuous cable with 
several buckets attached to scoop nodules up from the seabed,12 Of 
these various techniques, the HD method is favored by the inter-
national consortia.13 After collection, the nodules must be refined, 
either in land-based or shipboard plants.14 Chemical leaching and 
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. v 1081). 
9 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at xvi. 
10 [d. 
11 [d. at 7. 
12 Whitney, Environmental Regulation of United States Deep Seabed Mining, 19 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 77, 79 (1977). 
13 U.S. DEP'T. COM., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., DEEP SEABED MINING: 
MARINE ENVTL. RESEARCH PLAN 1981-85 30 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MARINE RE-
SEARCH PLAN]. 
14 Whitney, supra note 12, at 80-81. 
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hydrometallurgical techniques appear to be the most commer-
cially feasible methods.15 
The mining processes developed by the industry have raised 
serious concern over the environmental impact of deep seabed 
mining and the subsequent refining of minerals. One major con-
sideration is the degree to which the ocean floor itself will be 
disturbed. All three recovery systems bring bottom sediments to 
the surface along with the manganese nodules. This form of 
particulate pollution may cause hyperproductivity of phyto-
plankton and retard plant life at lower levels. 16 
Relying on the DOMES mining tests, NOAA concluded that 
there would be several important environmental impacts caused 
by deep seabed mining. One impact was the destruction of benthic 
fauna in and near the collector track caused by the collector itself. 
While NOAA was unable to conclude that destruction of benthic 
populations would be significant, there were obvious adverse im-
pacts. NOAA estimates revealed that one percent of the DOMES 
area would be directly affected by nodule collectors during a 
twenty year mining period if five operators were engaged in 
mining. In addition, five percent of the DOMES area containing 
the richest mineral concentrations would be directly impacted. 
NOAA cited three factors that were to be studied: (1) the rate of 
recolonization, (2) the type of species that recolonized the affected 
area, and (3) the linkage between the food chains found in the 
water column and on the ocean floor.J7 
In addition to the destruction of benthic populations, NOAA 
found that disturbance of the ocean floor could result in increased 
sedimentation and suspended matter in water near the seabed. 
Commonly referred to as the "rain of fines," this form of pollution 
would occur as the nodule collector moved along the bottom and 
created a cloud of fine sedimentary particulates. It is claimed that 
the rain of fines would probably result in the smothering of im-
mobile creatures and the covering over of the food supply of 
bottom feeders. Due to these initial predictions, NOAA scheduled 
further research to examine not only the effects on the flora and 
fauna, but also particulate settling rates and patterns. Possible 
means of mitigating these environmental impacts included: (1) 
improved collector design to minimize the rain of fines, (2) com-
13 Id. at 79. 
'6 Id. at 80. 
'7 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 75, 100-02. 
278 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [VoL 12:273 
pact mining sites to minimize impact area, and (3) a controlled 
dispersion of the rain of fines.18 
A final threat outlined by NOAA involves increased turbidity in 
the surface discharge area.19 In the course of reaching the man-
ganese nodules, mining ships would bring up bottom sediment. As 
this sediment was discharged from the mining ships, the sediment 
would create a plume in the surface water. The plume would 
reduce light penetration and thus impair photosynthesis and 
primary food production.20 If this sediment settled or dispersed too 
slowly, large areas of the ocean would be adversely affected.21 
After researching the problem involving the plume, NOAA con-
cluded that during commercial mining the plume from one ship 
would cause a 50 percent reduction in primary food production in 
a 10 kilometer by 2 kilometer area. While it was postulated that 
this plume would disperse in a matter of days and cause little 
damage,22 this prediction was only based on a few measurements. 
Consequently, NOAA concluded that the accuracy of the analysis 
"must be evaluated in future field or laboratory tests."23 
A further problem associated with surface discharges involved 
bacteria attached to the settling sediment. This bacteria could use 
some or all of the oxygen situated in oxygen-scarce water levels.24 
The plume might also affect important fish species such as tuna. 
Despite this threat, NOAA concluded that short-term exposure to 
the plume would not harm the health of fish.25 The effect of the 
plume on fish reproduction was not examined by NOAA, but the 
potential for significant effects was thought to be remote.26 
NOAA was also concerned that bottom sediment might contain 
spores, bacteria, antibodies, or other dormant or active organisms. 
When brought to the surface, one of these environmental 
"wildcards" could upset the surface ecosystem, endangering flora, 
fauna, or peopleP After considering this impact, NOAA concluded 
18 [d. at 103-06. 
19 MARINE RESEARCH PLAN, supra note 13, at 4. 
20 R. FRANK, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
FRANKl. 
21 [d. at 15. 
22 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 95. 
23 [d. at 96. 
24 FRANK, supra note 20, at 16. 
25 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 85. 
26 [d. at 108-09. 
27 FRANK, supra note 20, at 17. 
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that these possibilities did not warrant serious consideration.28 A 
final concern, which remains unresolved, is the impact ofpollutive 
chemicals used in processing the nodules. The refining process, 
whether land-based or shipboard, will use heavy alkaline and 
acid-based chemicals. It is feared that the disposal of the chemical 
wastes resulting from refining will present a difficult problem. 
Dumping these wastes into the ocean may severely strain the 
marine ecosystem.29 
NOAA's findings were only the first step in analyzing the envi-
ronmental impact of deep seabed mining. After the initial studies, 
which culminated in the Seabed EIS, NOAA planned environ-
mental monitoring during later mining tests to determine if the 
mining effects were consistent with those predicted in the Seabed 
EIS and to detect any other significant environmental effects. 
Monitoring also constituted the means for determining whether 
those miners, conducting tests, were complying with the licensing 
terms, conditions, and restrictions. In addition, the monitoring 
was designed to assist NOAA in developing proper regulations for 
commercial mining.30 
In the Seabed EIS, NOAA stated that because the determina-
tions involving environmental impacts were based on "brief pe-
riods of pilot-scale mining," the NOAA Administrator intended to 
verify or update these determinations by requiring monitoring of 
demonstration scale mining tests, conducted by the seabed min-
ing industry.3! Therefore, while NOAA was hopeful that deep 
seabed mining would have acceptable environmental effects, 
NOAA was still uncertain about the environmental impacts of 
full-scale commercial mining. 
Pursuant to the Seabed Resources Act,32 NOAA promulgated, 
in 1981, regulations regarding exploration licenses for seabed min-
ing.33 Each license required an environmental impact statement 
prepared by NOAA.34 Under the Act, NOAA was required to 
utilize the best available technologies to mitigate significant ef-
fects on safety, health or the environment, unless the benefits 
28 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 84-85. 
29 Whitney, supra note 12, at 81. 
30 U.S. DEP'T. COM., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., DEEP SEABED MINING: 
FINAL TECHNICAL GUIDANCE DOC. 15 (1981). 
31 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at xix. 
32 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. V 1981). 
33 30 U.S.C. § 1468 (1980), 15 C.F.R. Part 970 (1981). 
34 30 U.S.C. § 1419(d) (1980). 
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from using the technologies were clearly insufficient to justify 
their costs.35 
III. PARTICULATE POLLUTION AND THE POLITICS OF THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 
Despite what seemed to be a sincere concern for the environ-
ment, the central debate over deep seabed mining had a different 
form: the definition of ownership of seabed resources and the 
creation of a rational system of regulating their exploitation. 
After providing a brief overview of the Law of the Sea, this 
section will review the U.S. response to the results of UN CLOS 
III, and analyze how environmental concerns, which were devel-
oped and documented by NOAA, never received adequate consid-
eration. Following the McDougal/Lasswell model, this section will 
then discuss the goals of international environmental law, the 
history behind disagreement over the Law of the Sea, and policy 
alternatives and recommendations. 
A. The LOS Convention 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, disagreement over ownership 
of the seabed hovered somewhere between the extremes of res 
nullius (the property of nobody) and res communes (things com-
mon to all).36 Prior to UNCLOS III, it appeared that private 
mining of the deep seabed was authorized under international 
customary and treaty law, but that exclusive mining claims prob-
ably were not.37 The ultimate product of UNCLOS III was the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention).38 The LOS 
Convention and its forerunners, the "negotiating texts," reflected 
the deep seabed theories of the Third World countries.39 The Third 
World countries, who dominated the deep seabed negotiations 
during UNCLOS III, theorized that deep sea exploitation outside 
the confines of the 1982 LOS Convention provisions was illegal. 
35 Id. at § 1419(b). 
36 Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining 
Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1159 (1977). Res communis is frequently misspelled res 
communes. 
37 See id. at 1180-81. 
3. Done, Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as LOS Convention]. 
39 For an analysis of customary international law vis-a-vis the LOS Convention, see 
Howard, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty! 
Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321 (1981). 
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Since the provisions of the LOS Convention reflected and codified, 
in part, the international customary law as of 1982, the debate 
over deep seabed mining intensified. 
Naturally, the uncertain status of deep sea resources through-
out the UNCLOS III negotiations made the mining consortia, 
particularly U.S. members, hesitant to proceed with deep seabed 
mining,40 and prompted the Seabed Resources Act of 1981. To 
understand how the policy conflicts between the United States 
and other participating members at the LOS Convention were 
created, and why such conflicts prevented environmental prob-
lems from being addressed, the U.S. position involving deep sea-
bed mining must be reviewed from its beginning. This section will 
demonstrate how particulate pollution issues must be viewed 
within the penumbra of serious and strategic policy differences. 
During the late 1960s, the United States fostered its interest in 
deep seabed mining for a variety of reasons. Steel, which is essen-
tial to any highly industrialized country, could not be manufac-
tured without manganese, and approximately 98 percent of the 
U.S. manganese requirement continued to be imported.41 Cobalt 
and nickel, also necessary to the U.S. economy, were imported 
during 1978 at rates of 98 and 71 percent, respectively.42 Other 
estimates indicated that the United States imported 100 percent 
of its cobalt and 95.9 percent of its nickel.43 The primary metals 
found in manganese nodules were crucial to industrial protection, 
particularly the electrical and steel industries; these metals were 
also essential for products requiring high temperature alloys.44 
In the mid-1970s, it became evident that "actions by the mineral 
exporting nations evidence[d] a determination to cartelize and to 
follow the successful example of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC)."45 The prospect of a cartelization of 
the mineral exporters resurrected specters of the 1973 OPEC oil 
embargo46 and served as an example of the vulnerability of the 
40 See Whitney, supra note 12, at 89. 
41 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 6. 
42 Slappey, Who Will Reap the Mineral Riches of the Deep?, NATIONS BUS., Mar. 1978, at 
25,32. 
43 SEABED EIS, supra note 1, at 6. 
44 Id. 
45 Pietrowski, Hard Minerals On The Deep Floor: Implications For American Law And 
Policy, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 43, 44 (1977). Contra Note, Unilateral Deep Seabed 
Mining and Environmental Standards: A Risky Venture, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 345, 
349-50 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Risky Venture]. 
4<l Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 44. 
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United States to resource exporters and as an example of the 
concomitant dangers to national security.47 Moreover, imports of 
manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt continued to contribute to 
the U.S. trade deficit. It was estimated that the mining of man-
ganese nodules could make the United States· self-sufficient in 
these minerals by the year 2000.48 The contribution of deep seabed 
mining to a positive balance of trade for the United States could 
not be ignored. 
The interests of the U.S. seabed mining industry in the rapid 
development of deep seabed mining paralleled those of the 
policy-makers in respective U.S. administrations from Presidents 
Nixon to Reagan. Through heavy research and development ex-
penditures, U.S. companies developed advanced technologies for 
deep seabed mining.49 Even so, the delays in proceeding with deep 
seabed mining made it increasingly difficult for U.S. companies to 
recover their research and development investments. Competi-
tion for mining sites also became more intense as an increasing 
number of foreign companies became involved in deep seabed 
mining. Accordingly, U.S. companies developed a strong interest 
in the rapid implementation of deep seabed mining.50 
With these strong interests in mind, U.S. negotiators ap-
proached the Law of the Sea deliberations with a deep commit-
ment to protecting their own investments. During 1982, six objec-
tions were made to the LOS Convention.51 First, the United States 
believed that the LOS Convention and prior negotiating texts 
deterred the development of deep seabed resources, which were 
necessary to meet both U.S. and international demand.52 Those 
policies enumerated in the LOS Convention which tended to curb 
the development of seabed resources included: 
a. the policies of the International Seabed Authority (lSA) 
which were designed to regulate seabed mining and which 
gave priority to concerns other than those encouraging 
efficient and economic resource development; 
47 See Kindt, Inve8tment Interdependence a8 a Potential Respon8e by the United State8 
to Future Arab Oil Embargoes, 7 AUSTRAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 279, 280-82 (1981), 
48 Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 45-46. But see Risky Venture, supra note 45, at 348-50. 
49 Whitney, supra note 12, at 77. 
iIO But see Risky Venture, supra note 45, at 348-50. 
5. Bureau Pub. Aff., U.S. Dep't St., Law of the Sea: Current Pol'y No. 371, 2-3 (Jan.-Feb. 
1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS 1982 Press Release]; U.S. Dep't St., Report of the United 
States Delegation to the Eleventh Session Of The United Nations Conference On The 
Law Of The Sea, March 8-ApriI30, 1982, 1 (June 1982) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Eleventh 
Session Report]. 
52 LOS 1982 Press Release, supra note 51, at 2. 
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b. the production ceiling which set limits on the quantity of 
minerals which could be mined; 
c. the limit placed on the number of mining 'bperations that 
anyone country could conduct, thus potentially restrict-
ing the ability of the United States to supply the consump-
tion demands from the seabed; and 
d. the discretionary nature of the administrative and regula-
tory policy areas which discouraged deep seabed mineral 
development if implemented in accordance with the pro-
duction policies of ISA.53 
283 
Secondly, the policies set forth in the LOS Convention did not 
guarantee qualified applicants national access to deep seabed 
minerals; rather, the Enterprise, the operating arm of the ISA, 
was given the opportunity to establish a monopoly over the re-
sources. Moreover, the policies did not encourage economic devel-
opment of mineral resources},4 
The LOS Convention provided no assurance that any qualified 
private applicants sponsored by the United States would be 
awarded deep seabed mining contracts.;)5 The United States be-
lieved that a contract should be granted to any qualified appli· 
cant, and that absent a vote by objective technical experts who 
found that the applicant's qualifications were improperly or 
falsely certified, the ISA should accept the certification provided 
by the sponsoring country.56 
The United States also desired provisions (termed "grandfather 
clauses") for protecting the legal and commercial rights of those 
pioneer investors who had already made substantial investments 
in deep seabed mining.57 It was argued that "[d]eep seabed min-
eral resources ... [would] not be made available without the 
continuing efforts of pioneer miners.";)B 
Similarly, the United States opposed the system of privileges 
created by the LOS Convention, which discriminated against the 
private side of the parallel system for mining the seabed.59 Under 
the LOS Convention, private companies were basically manipu-
lated into entering joint ventures with either developing coun-
tries or with the Enterprise, thus enabling the Enterprise to 
53 ld. 
54 ld. 
55 ld. 
56 ld. 
57 ld. 
5" ld. 
5. ld. at 3. 
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establish monopolistic control over deep seabed mineral re-
sources.60 • 
The third objection of the United States to the LOS Convention 
was particularly important to policy-oriented decision-makers. 
The LOS Convention did not provide a decision-making role con-
cerning the deep seabed regime which fairly reflected and effec-
tively protected the economic, political, and financial interests of 
the United States.61 The United States had the potential for being 
the largest financial contributor to the Enterprise as well as the 
largest consumer of deep seabed minerals.62 It was essential, 
therefore, for the United States to have affirmative influence in 
the decision-making process sufficient to protect U.S. interests.63 
The U.S. strongly objected to the procedure followed when 
adopting amendments to the LOS Convention. Two-thirds of the 
member States acting at the scheduled review conference could 
adopt amendments which would be binding on all States parties, 
regardless of their concurrence.64 If the United States or any 
other country were to object to an amendment, that country 
would only have the option of withdrawing from the LOS Conven-
tion. Not surprisingly, this procedure was unacceptable to those 
countries who would necessarily have major economic interests, 
as well as substantial capital investments, at risk.65 The United 
States could not allow itself to be bound automatically by 
amendments without the option of maintaining its own approval 
procedure as a participating State; specifically, the advice and 
consent of the U.S. Senate.66 
As a further objection, the United States asserted that the LOS 
Convention had set undesirable international precedents.67 These 
objectionable precedents included, inter alia, artificial production 
limits and the mandatory transfer of seabed mining technology 
from the developed countries to the underdeveloped countries. 
The sixth and final objection by the United States involved the 
overall realization that these objectionable policies, as enumer-
ated in the LOS Convention, would probably not receive the 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
s.; Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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consent of the U.S. Senate.68 Provisions such as the mandatory 
transfer of private technology and the participation by and fund-
ing of national liberation movements, such as the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, would not be acceptable to the Senate. 
These provisions would impose commercial and economic hard-
ships upon those private companies required to transfer their 
advanced technology through a forced sale.69 
In an attempt to outline U.S. objections to some of the provi-
sions in the LOS Convention, the United States promulgated a 
series of amendments to the UNCLOS III negotiators on March 
11, 1982.70 This package of amendments, popularly known as the 
"Green Book," was a formalization of an "alternative approaches 
paper" which the United States had circulated during the inter-
sessional meeting, held from February 24 to March 2, 1982.71 The 
paper presented at the intersessional meeting outlined the major 
U.S. concerns regarding the deep seabed mining provisions, and 
proposed several solutions to the U.S. concerns.72 The Green Book 
was an attempt to put the U.S. proposals in the form of specific 
textual language, as required by the Group of 77, a powerful bloc 
of over 100 developing countries.73 When disseminating the Green 
Book, the U.S. delegation asserted that the proposed amendments 
constituted only one of a number of possible solutions and that no 
ultimatum was intended.74 Specifically, the U.S. delegation em-
phasized that the only purpose of the Green Book was to provide 
specific textual language as requested by the Group of 77.75 How-
ever, the Green Book made it apparent to the other delegations 
that the six objections of the United States could not be satisfied 
without substantive changes being made in the negotiating text 
for the LOS Convention, which had been finalized by the other 
countries participating in UNCLOS III. Accordingly, the Green 
Book prompted a significant adverse reaction from many coun-
tries at UNCLOS IIU6 
In this context, three heuristic models evolved which reflect the 
views and opinions of varying groups concerning the position that 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 4. 
70 U.S. Eleventh Session Report, supra note 51, at 2. 
71 Id. at 1-2. 
72 Id. at 2. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
n Id. 
76 I d. at 2-3. 
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the United States should have taken with regard to the policies 
promulgated by UNCLOS III.77 The first model was termed the 
"Richardson view." Essentially, this model rested on a strong 
realization that the LOS Convention was "important to the over-
all interests of the United States ... that at stake here [was] a 
matter of institution-building, a matter of strengthening the 
United Nations system and global law-making machinery."78 The 
most important issues to be considered were those involving 
navigational freedoms and other important security objectives.79 
An implicit part of this view was the determination that the LOS 
Convention represented the best text which could be negotiated.80 
Finally, it was believed that this view could receive the requisite 
support and backing of the U.S. Senate.81 After 1977, adherents of 
this model urged the United States to move forward with the 
treaty text as negotiated, while still trying to single out and 
modify a few remaining problems (such as providing "preparatory 
investment protection" (PIP) for the research investments made 
by the seabed mining industry) prior to submitting the final LOS 
Convention to the Senate.1l2 It was an optimistic view of progress. 
The second model, the "skeptical view," was not as cohesive as 
the Richardson view, primarily because it represented a number 
of diverse viewpoints that moved together in significant opposi. 
tion to the Richardson view.!l3 One segment supporting the skepti-
cal view argued that the LOS Convention was unnecessary to the 
United States. Proponents of this view argued that any LOS 
Convention would necessarily involve relinquishing the access 
rights of the United States to deep seabed minerals.84 The skepti-
cal view also tended to stress the importance of the access issue 
since U.S. economic needs dictated that the United States have 
access to the cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel on the deep 
seabed. By comparison, the Richardson view tended to stress the 
navigational issues and did not argue the issue of the relative 
importance of U.S. access to seabed minerals.85 Another compo-
77 Moore, Charting a New Course in the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. 
& POL'y 207, 210-16 (1981). 
7H [d. at 211. 7. [d. 
HO [d. 
"' [d. 
"-' [d. 
H3 [d. at 211-12 . 
.. [d. at 212. 
~; [d. 
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nent of the skeptical view was that the policies set forth by the 
LOS Convention would, in all likelihood, not be endorsed by the 
U.S. Senate.86 There were "simply too many kinds of problems, too 
many different diverse groups, and ... a more broadly based 
consensus including the seabed mining industry [was necessary] 
to move this treaty forward."87 
It can be argued that the third model, the "balanced view," 
included the best and most practical elements of both the 
Richardson view and the skeptical view.88 Proponents of this view 
believed that acceptance of the LOS Convention was important to 
the national interest of the United States and that the 
"institution-building" elements of the LOS Convention were sig-
nificant.89 The United States Was successful in negotiating the 
essential provisions protecting navigational freedoms and U.S. 
national security.90 Alternatively, this view proposed a firm posi-
tion with regard to the U.S. national interest in guaranteed ac-
cess to deep seabed minerals.91 However, the regime that had 
been negotiated at UNCLOS III on assured access, a significant 
economic issue, was subject to differing interpretations.92 Beyond 
these basic Law of the Sea issues, the following areas were found 
to have major institutional defects concerning the deep seabed 
mining provisions:93 
a. the test was ambiguous as to whether or not terrorist 
groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization 
would be allowed a percentage of the revenues acquired 
from deep seabed mining;94 
b. the Eastern European "Socialist Bloc" and the USSR 
were given three permanent seats on the Council of the 
ISA;95 however, the United States would have, at best, 
only one seat which could periodically be rotated off if U.S. 
allies ever decided that some other NATO member had 
the right to participate on the Council;96 
c. the review provision clause called for a review conference 
8" I d. at 213. 
87 Id. 
BB Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 214. 
98 Id. 
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to be held to reexamine the deep seabed mining issue after 
15 years97-at which time it would be decided whether 
changes would be implemented concerning the pro-
visions and if an agreement could not be reached within 
5 years, a conference vote could be taken and the entire 
issue of deep seabed mining could be rewritten by a 
single two-thirds vote, and the new provisions would be 
binding on every nation that was a signatory, whether or 
not that country voted for it;98 and 
d. the mandatory transfer of technology provision was 
viewed as being an absolute treaty-stopper,99 since this 
provision amounted to a forced sale of the technological 
lead of the U.S. seabed mining industry.lOo 
While the balanced view was arguably the best approach, the 
Reagan Administration accepted the skeptical view. As a result, 
the United States forced a vote on the LOS Convention on April 
30, 1982, during the eleventh and final negotiating session of 
UNCLOS IIvol The Conference adopted the LOS Convention by a 
vote of 130 in favor and 4 against (Israel, Turkey, the United 
States, and Venezuela).H'2 There were also 17 abstentions, includ-
ing: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Spain, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom, and the East European Bloc, except RomaniaY13 
A forced vote by the United States seemed to alienate the 
international community from the U.S. positions not only on Law 
of the Sea issues, but also on other issues as well. Like many of its 
major allies, the United States could have abstained, thereby 
registering dissatisfaction with the LOS Convention while still 
maintaining some international posture. By force a vote and 
then voting against the LOS Convention, the United States was 
perceived as attacking a ten year diplomatic effort by the entire 
international community, rather than registering its concerns 
over what it viewed as unreasonable economic concessions. 
97 Id. 
9. Id. 
99 Id. at 215. 
100 Id. 
101 U.S. Eleventh Session Report, supra note 51, at 1. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. For an analysis of the policies of the Reagan Administration regarding 
UNCLOS III, see Larson, The Reagan Administration and the Law afthe Sea, 11 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 297 (1982). 
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B. Goals 
The three overall goals involving the international environ-
ment have been delimited as: 1) protecting common interests and 
rejecting special interests; 2) minimizing damage to the environ-
ment (the "negative goal"); and 3) utilizing the positive motiva-
tion of optimum order (including preserving the environment and 
securing its most constructive use for present and future genera-
tions).l04 At first, it appeared that the goals of U.S. foreign policy 
regarding deep seabed mining constituted special interests and 
should have been rejected. However, when the U.S. goals were 
examined more closely, it became apparent that these goals were 
shared, with a few exceptions, by several of the industrialized 
countries at UNCLOS III, including the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United Kingdom. The history of the UNCLOS 
III negotiations discloses that the U.S. goals were not "special 
interests" but representative "common interests." It was within 
this context that Secretary of State Kissinger proposed, as a 
compromise, the parallel system which eventually became the 
basis for the deep seabed regime in the LOS Convention. 
By reviewing the history of the Committee I negotiations at 
UNCLOS III, including the drafting of the deep seabed mining 
regime, it becomes apparent that the common interest of man-
kind involved developing the deep seabed minerals within a sys-
tem which balanced the concerns of both the industrialized coun-
tries and the Group of 77. Unfortunately, the arguments asserted 
by the Group of 77 became so one-sided that, in the deep seabed 
provisions, the balance of concerns was lost and the common 
interest provisions were transformed largely into special interest 
provisions. 
Amid the rancor which accompanied the Committee I negotia-
tions, there was little consideration of the two other overall goals: 
minimizing damage to the marine environment, and preserving 
the marine environment and securing its most constructive use 
for present and future generations. While the United States had 
attempted to gauge the environmental effects from the particu-
late pollution of deep seabed mining,t05 the negative goal of 
minimizing damage to the marine environment was largely ig-
nored by Committee 1. The negotiators were preoccupied with 
arguing over developmental concerns and the distribution of 
104 McDougal, supra note 1, at 1089-91. 
105 See text and note at notes 4-9, 16-35. 
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ocean resources. A myopic fixation on "ocean wealth" resulted in 
provisions governing the minutia of developmental consid-
erations. By comparison, only a few relatively broad provisions 
governing environmental considerations were incorporated into 
the seabed mining provisions of the LOS Convention. 
The Committee I negotiators' concern over economic consid-
erations overshadowed the important subgoals of minimizing 
marine damage. The seabed mining provisions designed by Com-
mittee I did not promote the subgoals of restoration, rehabilita-
tion, or reconstruction. The negotiators were preoccupied by de-
velopmental concerns; consequently, long-term environmental 
considerations were largely ignored. While the large-scale mining 
of the ocean was arguably far in the future, provisions for envi-
ronmental concerns should have been more detailed. 
The concepts of prevention and deterrence were also generally 
ignored. Since deep seabed mining had not begun during 
UNCLOS III and since prevention and deterrence were immedi-
ate subgoals, proper consideration of these two subgoals could 
have obviated the necessity to emphasize the other three sub-
goals. However, Committee I placed too little emphasis on preven-
tion and deterrence. As a result, the failure to achieve provisions 
which would adequately incorporate these subgoals will create 
future problems involving particulate pollution from deep seabed 
mining. 
Professor John Norton Moore has analyzed these overall goals 
and subgoals in the context of ocean policy. He provides the 
following goals: 1) security; 2) management (avoidance, reduction, 
and settlement) of conflict; 3) promotion of efficiency and fair 
access in ocean use; 4) protection of the environment; and 5) 
promotion of ocean knowledgeYl6 A sixth overall goal, according to 
Moore, is the "maintenance of a favorable legal order."lo7 In the 
context of particulate pollution, the most relevant consideration 
in the overall goal of "protecting the environment" consists of the 
"effective prevention of oceans pollution through identification of 
threats, understanding of the fate and effects of pollutants, sys-
tematic monitoring, and institutionalization of measures to end 
serious threats."lo8 While the DOMES project of the United States 
has promoted the identification of the threat of particulate pollu-
106 Moore, A Foreign Policy For The Oceans, in THE OCEANS AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POllCY 2 (Center for Oceans Law & Pol'y, Apr. 1978). 
107 Id. 
10" Id. at 3. 
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tion, the LOS Convention provides little assistance in collating 
fate and effects studies, establishing systematic monitoring of 
future particulate pollution, or institutionalizing measures to 
cope with serious pollution threats such as particulate pollution 
from deep seabed mining. 
Pollution resulting from the disruption of the seabed and the 
refining of manganese nodules has not received adequate atten-
tion, despite the fact that the impact of deep seabed mining could 
be devastating to marine ecosystems. In light of this threat, any 
system of regulation must set environmental protection as a goal 
of first priority.H19 A system of regulation must be designed to 
incorporate all environmental goals to promote the maintenance 
of a favorable legal order and to avoid future political conflicts 
resulting from deep seabed mining. 
C. Historical Background 
The third task of the McDougal/Lasswell format is the "histori-
cal task," which provides perspective by reviewing precedent with 
regard to the evolving Law of the Sea. The context in which the 
LOS Convention provisions were formulated adds to an under-
standing of the positions asserted by the respective sides in the 
debate involving deep seabed mining. An overview of the sig-
nificant events in the evolution of the modern Law of the Sea 
reveals that countries formulated their positions and reduced 
their negotiating flexibility over a period of years. 
This process began with the early U.N. negotiations on the Law 
of the Sea. The First U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I) was convened in 1958. Deep seabed mining was 
implicitly governed by the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
(High Seas Convention),110 which was one of four conventions 
produced by UNCLOS I. Article 2 of the High Seas Convention 
implied that deep seabed mining was legal as long as "reasonable 
regard to the interests of other States" was given, and 
sovereignty was not claimed.llJ The High Seas Convention did not 
deal explicitly with deep seabed mining because it had "not yet 
109 See Whitney, supra note 12, at 78, 80-81. 
110 Done, Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 2 D.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 D.N.T.S. 82 (entered 
into force Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention]; see Pietrowski, 
supra note 45, at 52-53. 
m High Seas Convention, supra note 110, art. 2; Pietrowski, supra note 44, at 53. 
~----------
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assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special regula-
tion."ll2 
The Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
II) was convened in Geneva in 1960 primarily to consider the issue 
of the territorial sea. The 88 delegates who attended failed to 
reach agreement, and UNCLOS II had little impact on the issue 
of deep seabed mining. 
Deep seabed mining was again addressed in the now-famous 
speech by the Maltese Ambassador to the U.N., Arvid Pardo.J13 
Ambassador Pardo declared that the mineral wealth of the deep 
seabed should be considered as the "common heritage of man-
kind."ll' In response to Pardo's speech, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the 
Peaceful Uses of the Deep Seabed (the Ad Hoc Seabed Commit-
tee).ll3 
The 35 member States of the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee met in 
1968 to develop a practical means to promote international coop-
eration in the exploration, conservation, and utilization of the 
seabed. At its next session, the General Assembly created the 
standing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (the Sea-
bed Committee) to replace the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee.116 
In 1970, the General Assembly adopted the draft Declaration of 
Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,1l7 
prepared by the Seabed Committee. The Declaration contained 
the following guidelines: 
1) The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction ... [the Area], as well 
as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of 
mankind. 
2) The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any 
means by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no 
112 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No.9) at 24. 
113 U.N. Doc. AlAC.135!1, at 27 (1967). 
114 See Note, The History of Negotiations Concerning the System of Exploitation of the 
International Seabed, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 483, 485 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
History]. 
II> See Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 55; History, supra note 114, at 485-89. 
116 Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 55. 
117 G.A. Res. 2749, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1970) (l08 for, 0 
against, 14 abstentions). 
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State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign 
rights over any part thereof. 
3) No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exer-
cise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its re-
sources incompatible with the international regime to be 
established and the principles of this Declaration. 
4) All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of 
the resources of the area and other related activities shall 
be governed by the international regime to be estab-
lished,11s 
293 
Following the Declaration of Principles, the General Assembly 
called for the convening of UNCLOS III. 
The first substantive session of UNCLOS III convened in 
Caracas in June, 1974. Three committees were established, and 
Committee I was assigned the responsibility of negotiating a 
compromise to the deep seabed problem,l19 Negotiating flexibility 
began to diminish significantly with the issuance of the Informal 
Composite Negotiating TexURevision 2 (ICNT/Rev. 2)120 which 
was released in 1980. It was intended that each of the negotiating 
texts would not "articulate a consensus on the subjects covered; 
... [but] serve only as a basis for further negotiations."121 How-
ever, the failure of the industrialized countries to negotiate 
changes in the ICNT/Rev.2 brought those countries to the reali-
zation that the deep seabed provisions embodied in the ICNT/ 
Rev.2 were unlikely to change significantly in future negotiating 
texts. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal 
Text) [DC(IT)],122 which was also released in 1980, further sup-
ported this conclusion. 
In 1981, the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Draft LOS 
Convention)123 further reinforced the deep seabed provisions. That 
same year, the Reagan Administration initiated a policy review 
which was transformed into a last attempt to amend the negotiat-
118 [d. 
119 See Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 57-59. For a discussion of the UNCLOS III, 1974 
Caracas Session, see Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975). 
120 U.N. Doc. AlCONF.621WP.10/Rev.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev.2]. For a 
discussion of the UNCLOS III Session at which the ICNT/Rev.2 was issued, see Oxman, 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 
AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1981). 
121 Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 59; see Sea Law Conference To Meet Again Next March; 
Substantial Progress Said Made Since Caracas, U.N. CHRON., Oct. 1978, at 41 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Sea Law]. 
122 U.N. Doc. AlCONF.62IWP.10/Rev.3 9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DC(IT)]. 
123 U.N. Doc. AlCONF.621L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft LOS Convention]. 
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ing text (pursuant to the "Green Book"). The attempt to modify 
the Draft Convention failed and the final negotiating text became 
the LOS Convention when it was adopted by UNCLOS III during 
the vote which was forced by the United States.l24 On July 9,1982, 
President Reagan, citing the onerous provisions on deep seabed 
mining, stated that the United States would not become a party 
to the LOS Convention.l25 
D. Trends and Conditioning Factors 
The ICNT/Rev.2 ostensibly was the negotiating text which rep-
resented the turning point in the negotiations in Committee I. 
When the unofficial Evensen Text, written before the ICNT/Rev.2 
was submitted to the committee chairman, Paul Engo, it was 
revised without consulting either the Committee or even a rep-
resentative subgroup.126 The result was the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (ICNT).I27 The United States and other devel-
oped countries maintained that the ICNT was a "drastic depar-
ture from the compromises reached in the Working Group unduly 
favoring the position of the radicals in the Group of 77."128 The 
controversial text provisions were retained in the Informal Com-
posite Negotiating Text/Revision 1 (ICNT/Rev.1),t29 as well as in 
the ICNT/Rev.2, the DC(IT), the Draft LOS Convention, and the 
final LOS Convention. The United States made it clear that the 
ICNT concepts on deep seabed mining provided an unacceptable 
system of regulation. 
The U.S. position was backed by several other industrialized 
countries. Since many leading and industrialized countries did 
124 See LOS Convention, supra note 38. See also K. SIMMONDS, U.N. CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982 vii (1983). 
125 SIMMONDS, supra note 124, at xvi-xvii. 
126 Charney, United States Interests in a Convention on the Law Of the Sea: The Case 
For Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 57 (1978). 
127 U.N. Doc.AlCONF.62IWP.10, 8 OmCIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT]. For a 
discussion of the ICNT, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978). 
128 Charney, supra note 126, at 57; see ICNT, supra note 127, arts. 133-91; Oxman, The 
Law of the Sea Conference and Development: Food and Energy Resources, 13 LAW. AM. 
157 (1981). The deep seabed mining negotiations produced sharp divisions between the 
industrialized and the developing countries despite the fact that deep seabed mining will 
have little impact on the development of the developing countries before the end of the 
twentieth century. 
129 U.N. Doc.AlCONF.621WP.10/Rev.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev.l]. 
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not accept the LOS Convention, there is a considerable and per-
suasive argument that the deep seabed provisions will not consti-
tute international law, even if the LOS Convention receives 
enough accessions to enter into force. It is argued, however, that 
navigational and other provisions of the LOS Convention are 
representative of international customary law and are therefore 
enforceable principles. These arguments aside, it is important to 
review and understand the environmental provisions involving 
deep seabed mining as they evolved in the respective negotiating 
texts. 
Examination of the various negotiating texts and the final text 
reveals that after the rCNT (and particularly the ICNT/Rev.2), 
certain concepts remained relatively unchanged from session to 
session.l30 There seemed to be agreement that an International 
Sea-Bed Authority (ISA or "the Authority") would be established 
to control all deep seabed mining. The ISA was to consist of an 
Assembly, a Council (and concomitant commissions), a Sec-
retariat, and an Enterprise.13l The texts called for a form of exploi-
tation that would be conducted under Secretary Kissinger's 
"parallel system," involving both public and private developers.l32 
Rules and regulations to protect the ecosystem from harmful 
effects of development would be formulated by a Legal and Tech-
nical Commission.l33 While the United States did not agree with 
certain deep seabed mining provisions, these provisions and the 
environmental provisions in general were not objectionable. 
The Assembly was given the authority to establish general 
policies beyond those specified in the LOS Convention itself. The 
Council was designed to work with the Legal and Technical 
Commission to develop specific policies dealing with exploration 
lao See Charney, supra note 126, at 58. 
131 Revised Single Negotiating Test, U.N. Doc.NCONF.62'WP.8IRev.lIParts I, II, III, 5 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 125 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNT); U.N. Doc.NCONF.62'WP.9/Rev.2'Part IV, 6 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 144 (1977); see ICNT, supra note 127, arts. 154-86; ICNT/Rev. 28upra note 120, arts. 
156-85; DC(IT), supra note 122, arts. 156-85; Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, arts. 
156-85; LOS Convention, supra note 38, arts. 156-85. 
132 See RSNT, supra note 131, art. 22(1), Annex I; ICNT, supra note 127, art. 151(2)(ii), 
Annex II; ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 120, art. 153(2)(b), Annex III, DC(IT), supra note 122, 
art. 153(2)(b), Annex III, Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, art. 153(2Xb), Annex III, 
LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 153(2)(b), Annex III. 
133 RSNT, supra note 131, art. 31; ICNT, supra note 127, art. 163; ICNT/Rev.2, supra 
note 120, art. 165; DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 165, Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, 
art. 165, LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 165. 
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and exploitation activities and with the necessary protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. While there are several 
provisions involving the Legal and Technical Commission which 
charge that Commission with enforcing the environmental goals 
mentioned earlier, these provisions could have been stronger.l34 
The clear emphasis of the seabed mining provisions of the LOS 
Convention is on development and not on a balance between 
development and environmental protection. More importantly, 
the industrialized countries were not allowed to have the rep-
resentation which was commensurate with their worldwide 
influence and with their capital investments in deep seabed min-
ing. Since the developing countries have historically demon-
strated a reckless disregard for the environment,135 the ISA, 
which is overly-dominated by the developing countries, can be 
expected to perpetuate a de facto disrespect for the marine envi-
ronment regardless of the de jure concern expressed in the LOS 
Convention. 
The Enterprise was the entity designed to mine the seabed on 
behalf of the ISA. Proceeds from mining and licensing were to be 
distributed throughout the world community on an equitable 
basis. The distribution would take "into particular consideration 
the interest and needs of developing States and of peoples who 
have not attained full independence of other self-governing 
status."I36 
Areas of concern that still required substantial negotiation 
after the ICNT included: (1) the political governance of the ISA, 
the Council's jurisdiction, composition, and method of voting; (2) 
the method of exploitation; and (3) the resource policy of the 
ISA.137 During UNCLOS III, the U.S. negotiators believed that 
the ICNT political structure (retained in the ICNT/Rev.2) gave too 
much power to the Group of 77. As one commentator described 
the ICNT, "To the extent that the Assembly could dictate to the 
Council, the political control would rest in the one-nation, one-vote 
Assembly which would be dominated by the Group of 77."138 If the 
134 See LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 165, paras. 2(d)-(f), 2(h), and 2(k)-(m). 
135 See Note, Providing For Environmental Safeguards In the Development Loans 
Given By the World Bank Group to Developing Countries, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 540 
(1975). 
136 Compare LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 140, para. 1, with art. 160, para. 
(2)(f)(i). 
137 Charney, supra note 126, at 59. 
13" Id. at 61; see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
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Council was similarly constituted or if it adopted a one-nation, 
one-vote system, the ISA would be balanced against the devel-
oped States. 
As finalized in the LOS Convention, the Assembly "shall be 
considered the supreme organ of the Authority to which the other 
principal organs shall be accountable as specifically provided for 
in this Convention."139 The Assembly has the power to establish 
general policies "on any question or matter within the compe-
tence of the Authority."14o The Assembly also elects the members 
of the Council in accordance with Article 161.141 
The Council would be the executive organ of the ISA, with the 
power to establish specific policies for the ISA in conformity with 
the LOS Convention and with the general policies established by 
the Assembly.142 The Council would be composed of 36 members 
elected by the Assembly in the following order: (1) four members 
from among the countries that consume or import more than 2 
percent of those types of minerals to be derived from the Area, 
with one of the countries being the largest consumer and one of 
the four being an Eastern European nation; (2) four members 
from among the eight nations with large seabed mining invest-
ments, with at least one country from Eastern Europe; (3) four 
members from the group of the major mineral exporting coun-
tries, with at least two being developing countries; (4) six mem-
bers from among developing countries; and (5) eighteen members 
elected according to equitable principles of geographical distribu-
tion.143 
All three of the ICNT texts perpetuated the "parallel system" of 
exploitation. The ICNT texts, however, differed on the right of 
States and private enterprises to mine the deep seabed. Under 
the parallel system, any company or consortium seeking to mine 
the seabed would be required to propose two equally exploitable 
sites to the ISA. The ISA would then permit the consortium to 
begin mining one site, retaining the other for exploitation by the 
Enterprise.144 The ICNT/Rev.2, however, gave the ISA extensive 
The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Tenth 
Session] (some U.S. concern after Draft LOS Convention). 
139 LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 160, para. 1. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. at art. 160, para. 2(a). 
142 [d. at art. 162. 
143 [d. at art. 161, para. 1. 
144 Pietrowski, supra note 45, at 64-65. 
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powers to regulate access to States and private consortia.l45 No 
similar restrictions were placed on the activities of the Enter-
prise. In addition, the ICNT/Rev.2 required transfer of mining 
technology to the Enterprise.J46 The Enterprise, therefore, had a 
substantial competitive advantage over other miners. Moreover, 
the ICNT/Rev.2 dispute settlement procedures did not provide for 
review of problems arising out of the parallel system. 
The DC(IT), the Draft LOS Convention, and the LOS Conven-
tion retained the parallel system of exploitation. While seemingly 
appropriate, these texts were not amenable to renegotiation re-
garding those provisions which gave the ISA extensive powers to 
regulate or deny access.147 In addition, these texts required the 
transfer of mining technology to the Enterprise, a concept which 
the industrialized countries found particularly offensive.l48 
The resource policy issue concerns regulation of the quantity of 
minerals mined from the deep seabed. The ICNT limited produc-
tion of nickel from the seabed to the cumulative growth segment 
of the world nickel market for the first seven years of mining.l49 
For the following twenty years, the limit was set at sixty percent 
of the cumulative growth segment.1OO These limits were modified 
in the subsequent negotiating texts.l5l Finally, the texts evolved 
to where the DC(IT), the Draft LOS Convention, and the LOS 
Convention utilized a different production limit formula. The LOS 
Convention, like the DC(IT) and the Draft LOS Convention, pro-
vided that an interim period should begin five years prior to 
January 1 of the year in which the earliest commercial production 
was to start. This period was to last twenty-five years, or until 
either the end of the Review Conference referred to in article 155 
or new agreements entered force.l52 The Review Conference was 
scheduled to be held fifteen years from January 1 of the year of 
the earliest commercial production. The Review Conference was 
authorized to evaluate all aspects of the commercial production 
145 ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 120, art. 157. 
148 [d. at Annex III, art. 5. 
147 DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 157; Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, art. 157; 
LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 157. 
1.... DC(IT), supra note 122, Annex III, art. 5, Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, 
Annex III, art. 5; LOS Convention, supra note 38, Annex III, art. 5. 
149 ICNT, supra note 127, art. 150, para. l(g)(B)(i). 
150 [d. 
131 See, e.g., ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 120, art. 151, para. 2. 
152 DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 151, para. 2(a); Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, 
art. 151 para. 2(a); LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 151, para. 3. 
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activities and to make any changes needed to ensure that the 
goals and principles of the LOS Convention were upheld.153 
The production ceiling for any year of the interim period was 
designated as the sum of: (1) "the difference between the trend 
line values for nickel consumption ... for the year immediately 
prior to the year of the earliest commercial production and the 
year immediately prior to the commencement of the interim pe-
riod;"154 and (2) "sixty percent of the difference between the trend 
line values for nickel consumption ... for the year immediately 
prior to the year of the earliest commercial production."155 The 
trend line was to be derived from a linear regression of the 
logarithms of the "actual nickel consumption for the most recent 
15-year period ... time being the independent variable."I56 
While the different ICNT texts ostensibly limited only nickel 
production, their restrictions effectively limited the production of 
all metals from manganese nodules.157 Article 151, paragraph 2(f) 
of the DC(IT) and of the Draft LOS Convention, and article 151, 
paragraph 7 of the LOS Convention specifically limited the pro-
duction of other metals derived from manganese nodules.15B Simi-
lar to the later negotiating texts/59 the ICNT texts also required 
compensation for loss of exporting country revenues caused by 
seabed mining.l60 The industrialized countries feared that these 
requirements restricted deep seabed mining to the point where 
private consortia would not proceed with exploration and exploi-
tation.161 Thus, under the LOS Convention, the U.S. goal of becom-
ing self-sufficient in these minerals would not be achieved. 
153 DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 155; Draft LOS Convention, supra note 124, art. 155, 
LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 155. 
154 LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 151, para. 4(a)(i); see DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 
151, para. 2(b)(i); Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, art. 151, para. 2(b)(i). 
155 LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 151, para. 4(a)(ii); see DC(IT), supra note 122, 
art. 151, para. 2(b)(ii); Draft LOS convention, supra note 123, art. 151, para. 2(b)(ii). 
156 DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 151, para. 2(b)(iii); Draft LOS Convention, supra note 
123, art. 151, para. 2(b)(iii); LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 151, para. 4(b)(i). 
157 See Charney, supra note 125, at 61. 
158 DC(IT), supra note 122, art. 151, para. 2(f); Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123, 
art. 151, para. 2(f); LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 151, para. 7. 
159 ICNT, supra note 127, art. 150, para. l(g)(D); ICNT/Rev.1, supra note 129, art. 151, 
para. 4; ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 120, art. 151, para. 4. 
160 DC(IT), supra note 122, art, 151, para. 4; Draft LOS Convention, supra note 123 art. 
151, para. 4; LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 151, para. 10. 
161 See Charney, supra note 126, at 61; Tenth Session, supra note 138, at 9·10. 
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E. Policy Alternatives and Recommendations 
Failure to reach agreement on the seabed mining issue injured 
U.S. interests in several ways. First, the U.S. seabed mining 
industry lost much of its technological lead during the 
moratorium on seabed mining.l62 In addition, the delays in pro-
ceeding with deep seabed mining may have contributed to in-
creased trade deficits. Finally, the U.S. goal of mineral self-
sufficiency in important metals was delayed.l63 
Before ,the LOS Convention was finalized, four alternatives 
were available to the United States and to the other developed 
countries. The United States could have unilaterally abandoned 
the moratorium and initiated deep seabed mining. This alterna-
tive was partially implemented in the Seabed Resources Act of 
1980.164 Unilateral action, however, could have provoked a free-
for-all among the seabed miners of different nations racing to be 
first to claim and exploit the deep seabed minerals.l65 
A second alternative, designed to avoid international conflict, 
involved deep-sea mining through the negotiation of a series of 
bilateral treaties. Since only a few countries possess the technol-
ogy to mine the seabed, agreements between these countries were 
capable of being negotiated quickly. A similar bilateral approach 
has been successful in the area of fisheries, and the United States 
has negotiated many "Governing International Fishery Agree-
ments" (GIF As). This approach, while seemingly attractive, could 
have led to the collapse of UNCLOS III, jeopardizing other U.S. 
interests in the areas of navigation, living resources, environmen-
tal protection, and marine scientific researchYI6 
Since the United States decided not to sign the LOS Convention 
as adopted, the bilateral treaty approach appeared to offer the 
best possibilities for U.S. success in the commencement of seabed 
mining activities. These bilateral treaties, while seriously consid-
ered by the United States/67 were replaced by a multilateral 
"mini-treaty" with other industrialized countries. This multilat-
eral treaty was the Agreement Concerning Interim Arrange-
162 See Burton, supra note 36, at 1135-51. 
183 Sea Law, supra note 121, at 42. 
164 See supra text and note at note 32. 
1611 See Risky Venture, supra note 45, at 359-60. 
166 See Charney, supra note 126, at 45-52. 
187 SIMMONDS, supra note 125, at xviii. 
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ments Related to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed 
(Polymetallic Nodules Agreement).168 The Polymetallic Nodules 
Agreement was secretly negotiated during 1982 once the vote of 
April 30, 1982 had finalized the LOS Convention and eliminated 
any possibilities for modification of the UNCLOS III regime. The 
framework of the Polymetallic Nodules Agreement provides the 
flexibility for the United States to enter into bilateral agreements 
concerning deep seabed mining. To provide environmental pro-
tection and to keep the miners of anyone nation from gaining a 
competitive advantage, each bilateral agreement should establish 
and enforce environmental safeguards which are as broad in 
scope and as strict as the Seabed Resources Act.l69 
The third alternative would have been to accept the LOS Con-
vention as it was finalized and begin mining under its provisions. 
The LOS Convention, however, is so heavily balanced in favor of 
the developing countries that the United States would not realize 
the benefits of deep seabed mining. Most importantly, the U.S. 
consortia would not profit from the investments already made in 
mining technology. Acceptance of the LOS Convention would 
have involved sacrificing the principle of maximizing aggregate 
material through "free market" operations. Many disciples of the 
market system theorized that the deep seabed provisions of the 
LOS Convention inadequately considered free market values and 
f~vored too heavily distributional values instead of the expansion 
of aggregate wealth.17Q There are other principles, beyond the 
protection of aggregate wealth, which the LOS Convention should 
promote.l71 These include the importance of international order 
and stability, both in terms of relations between nations and 
making seabed mining attractive to private investors.l72 Addi-
tionally, such concepts as human rights, the free pursuit of 
knowledge, and international communication are important fac-
tors. l73 The value of protecting the environment, a final consider-
ation, can only be achieved by international standards that insure 
I'" Done, Sept. 2, 1982 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1982). 
169 Note, The Regulation of Seabed Mining Under the Reciprocating States Regime, 30 
AM. U.L. REV. 477, 514 (1980). 
170 Oxman, Introduction: On Evaluation the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, 19 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 456 (1982). 
171 Id. at 457. 
172 Id. at 458. 
173 Id. at 459-60. 
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both "fair competition" and the protection of the total marine 
environment.174 
IV. THE LAW OF THE SEA PROVISIONS: PROTECTION OF THE 
MARINE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AREA 
While the United States' rejection of the LOS Convention sub-
stantially weakened the value of the LOS Convention, a review of 
these provisions highlights the environmental concerns of the 
international community and the degree to which particulate 
pollution can be alleviated by maintaining a favorable interna-
tional legal order. Article 136 of the ICNT/Rev.2 asserts that 
"[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of man-
kind."l75 The DC(IT) and the Draft LOS Convention contain this 
statement as well, and it was finalized in the text by the LOS 
Convention. If indeed this concept is valid, a sine qua non is the 
protection of the marine environment as the heritage of mankind. 
Article 139 of the LOS Convention governs "[r]esponsibility to 
ensure compliance and liability for damage,"l76 and it appears that 
damages will result from a "breach of contract." However, the 
term "damages" is used in a broad manner and could conceivably 
include liability for harming the marine environment. As demon-
strated above, the potential harm from particulate pollution and 
from processing ships is significant. 
The marine pollution provisions governing the Area are subor-
dinated to the regular marine pollution provisions in Part XII.177 
Article 142, paragraph 3, states that: 
Neither this Part nor any rights granted or exercised pur-
suant thereto shall affect the right of coastal States to take 
such measures consistent with the relevant provisions of 
Part XII as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or elimi-
nate grave and imminent danger to their coastline, or related 
interests from pollution or threat thereof or from other 
hazardous occurrences resulting from or caused by any ac-
tivities in the Area.178 
This article appears to defer to the "specific" provisions of Part 
XII. Since particulate pollution will result from the activities of 
174 [d. at 459. 
J75 ICNT/Rev.2, supra note 120, art. 136; see nC(lT), supra note 122, art. 136; Draft LOS 
Convention, supra note 38, art. 136. 
178 LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 139. 
177 See id. at arts. 192-237. 
178 LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 142, para. 3. 
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mining ships and since sludge will result from the processing 
ships, it is not unreasonable to assert that article 211, regulating 
"vessel-source pollution," should govern ships engaged in deep 
seabed mining.179 This interpretation means that the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) has a great deal of authority 
in regulating "vessel-source pollution." 
The main provision governing protection of the marine envi-
ronment, article 145, states that necessary measures shall be 
taken in accordance with the LOS Convention in order to protect 
the marine environment,1BO The terminology, "in accordance with 
this Convention," is positioned before language which grants 
some power to the Authority.I81 Accordingly, under article 145, the 
Authority may only regulate pollution in the Area in a manner 
consistent with the regular marine pollution provisions of the 
LOS Convention. 
Under article 162, paragraph 2(w), the Council may "issue 
emergency orders, which may include orders for the suspension or 
adjustment of operations, to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment arising out of activities in the Area .... "182 This sec-
tion is designed for emergencies and is subject to the specific rules 
of Part XII. For example, if the IMO issued an order under article 
211 regulationsI83 due to a massive vessel-source oil spill in the 
Area and the Council issued a conflicting order under article 162, 
paragraph 2(w), the IMO order should take precedence. 
Article 162 also authorizes the establishment of "marine 
sanctuaries" or "wilderness areas" in the oceans under paragraph 
2(x) which allows the Council to "disapprove areas for exploitation 
by contractors or the Enterprise in cases where substantial evi-
dence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine environ-
ment .... "184 This paragraph inaugurates an important concept 
with regard to the marine environment, and marine sanctuaries 
should be encouraged. 
These minor environmental responsibilities within the 
penumbra of the Council appear to have been delegated to the 
Legal and Technical Commission under article 165, specifically 
179 [d. at art. 211. 
H'O [d. at art. 145. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. at art. 162, para. 2(w). 
183 [d. at art. 211. 
,,.. [d. at art. 162, para. 2(x). 
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paragraphs 2(f) and 2(g).185 These provisions confirm the interpre-
tation that the trend is to delegate marine pollution regulation to 
specific sections, and in particular, to Part XII. The main thrust of 
article 165 appears to be "monitoring"l86 the marine environment 
and making "recommendations."187 Paragraph 2(d) supports this 
conclusion by requiring the functional equivalent of an "interna-
tional environmental impact statement."188 Thus, the marine pol-
lution provisions in Part XI are general and more advisory in 
nature. Deference should, therefore, be given to the more specific 
pollution provisions in Part XII. 
Within Part XII, article 209 governs "Pollution from activities 
in the Area,"lS9 and article 215 involves "Enforcement with re-
spect to pollution from activities in the Area."l90 Since articles 209 
and 215 are not only general provisions, but also ambiguous ones, 
it could be argued that articles 208 and 214 governing "pollution 
from sea-bed activities" pre-empt the general provisions.191 By a 
similar logic, the vessel-source pollution provisions are quite 
specific, and therefore, article 211 should govern marine pollution 
from deep seabed mining.192 In light of this analysis, it would seem 
that articles 209 and 215 are inadequate193 and should not be 
utilized except when regulation through more specific provisions 
becomes impossible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1982 the Reagan Administration rejected the LOS Conven-
tion which had evolved from the UNCLOS III negotiations. This 
action was prompted by the deep seabed mining portion of the 
LOS Convention which included what was considered inequitable 
provisions biased against the United States and other developed 
countries. However, the environmental provisions of the LOS 
Convention relating to deep seabed mining were generally ac-
ceptable to the United States. A type of "international environ-
mental impact statement" was even included in the LOS Conven-
185 Id. at art. 165, para. 2(f)-2(g). 
IllS See, e.g., id. at art. 165, para. 2(h). 
187 Id. at art. 165, para. 2(e)-2(m). 
188 LOS Convention, supra note 38, art. 165, para. 2(d). 
1'" Id. at art. 209. 
190 Id. at art. 215. 
191 See id. at arts. 208, 214. 
192 LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 211. 
193 Id. at arts. 209, 215. 
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tion. The international acceptance of this concept and other envi-
ronmental principles by UNCLOS III were important advances in 
international environmental law. Unfortunately, enforcement 
mechanisms needed to be strengthened to ensure de facto im-
plementation of these principles and not just de jure acknowl-
edgement of them. 
The decade-long UNCLOS III negotiations yielded an unex-
pected benefit by providing the time necessary to conduct envi-
ronmental studies of the impacts of deep seabed mining to exploit 
manganese nodules. It is possible to extrapolate from these stud-
ies and to apply their environmental principles to other types of 
ocean mining such as mining for phosphorite nodules or dredging 
for minerals in coastal areas. The environmental impacts of dif-
ferent types of seabed mining can be collectively referred to as 
"particulate pollution," which is perhaps the largest and most 
noticeable environmental impact affecting the marine ecosystem. 
The United States and other countries need to continue their 
efforts to control particulate pollution from all types of seabed 
mining. In the absence of an acceptable UNCLOS III treaty, the 
United States will be faced with maintaining the environmental 
integrity of sites selected for deep seabed mining. While changing 
the LOS Convention in the immediate future is unlikely, the 
renegotiation of some of the provisions of the LOS Convention 
under its amendment provisions is a possible scenario for the 
future. 
Accordingly, the United States and its allies should build a 
record of possible changes which would make the LOS Convention 
acceptable. The changes can be divided into two categories: (1) 
minor changes, such as those which would strengthen the en-
forcement mechanisms for environmental protection of deep sea-
bed mining areas, and (2) substantive changes, such as the re-
negotiation of the transfer of technology provisions. The minor 
changes should be introduced and considered as being completely 
separate from the other changes. Hopefully, this approach will 
militate against an influx of historically volatile issues into the 
discussions involving minor changes. The goal is to renegotiate 
the provisions of the LOS Convention and reestablish the com-
mon interests in an equitable treaty regime. Once this is achieved, 
both developed and developing countries can address the more 
controversial, philosophical differences in the deep seabed mining 
provisions. This latter suggestion may appear to be impractical, 
but history has often demonstrated that negotiating positions can 
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change and that new conditioning factors can reveal negotiating 
flexibility where there was none before. 
International negotiators should remember that the develop-
ment of ocean resources necessarily requires environmental pro-
tection. The environmental costs of developing ocean resources 
should be "internalized," whereby the developers bear the costs of 
environmental protection as part of the cost of development. 
While this principle would reduce profits, it would place the bur-
den of environmental protection in its appropriate place-on the 
developer. In addition, the glow of "huge profits," which im-
passioned the UNCLOS III negotiations, would fade into "rea-
sonable profits" or perhaps even "minimal profits." This reduction 
in the ocean "ante" should provide a corresponding reduction in 
the vehement rhetoric which encompasses deep seabed mining. 
The future may eventually reveal that deep seabed mining can be 
conducted within an equitable framework which protects the 
ocean environment for future generations by internalizing the 
costs of environmental protection. 
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APPENDIX I 
CUMULAT1VE WORLD DEMAND FOR NODULE METALS AND 
THE DEEP SEABED CONTRIBUTION 
Deep Seabed Mining Deep Seabed 
Cumulative Production 
Total World Demand Production as a Percent 
to 2010 AD to 2010 AD of Total 
(x1()'1 short-tons) (x 1()'1 short-tons) World Demand 
31,000 11,300 36 
530,000 9,400 1.8 
1,400 1,400 100 
600,000 150,000 25 
Source: NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., U.S. DEPT. COM., 1 D~EP SEABED 
MINING: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATEM~NT 279 (1981). 
APPENDIX II 
DEEP SEABED MINING CONSORTIA INVOLVING U.S. FIRMS I--' ~ (INCLUDING DATES OF CONSORTIA FORMATION) 00 
~ 
Ocean 
Ocean Mining Management Ocean Minerals 
Kennecott Corp. Associates (OMA) Inc. (OM!) Company (OMCO) 
Nation (1174) (11174) (5175) (11174) 
United States Kennecott Corp. Deepsea Ventures, Sedco, Inc. Ocean Minerals, Inc. 
Noranda Explora- Inc. (Tenneco and *) (Lockheed Missiles 
tion, Inc. *Essex Minerals Co. & Space Co.; 
(U.S. Steel) Billiton**; BRW***) 
*Sun Ocean Ventures, Amoco Ocean Minerals t"'4 
Inc. (Sun Oil) Co., (Standard Oil ~ Co. of Indiana) 
Lockheed Systems 0 Co., Inc. 
(Lockheed Corp.) ~ 
Belgium *Union Seas, Inc. t-3 p:: 
(Union Miniere) t.%j 
Canada INCO, Ltd. 00 
Italy * Samin Ocean Inc. t.%j 
(Subsidiary of > 
Italian Govt.) 
Japan Mitsubishi Corp. Deep Ocean 
Mining Co., 
Ltd. 
Netherlands **Billiton B.V. 
(Royal Dutch Shell) 
***BRW Ocean 
Minerals (Royal ~ Bas Kalis 0 
Westminister ~ 
Group N.V.) 
Nation 
United 
Kingdom 
West Germany 
Kennecott Corp. 
(1/74) 
R.T.Z. Deep Sea 
Mining Enterprises, 
Ltd. 
Consolidated Gold 
Fields, Ltd. 
BP Petroleum 
Dev., Ltd. 
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Ocean Mining 
Associates (OMA) 
(11174) 
Ocean 
Management 
Inc. (OMI) 
(5/75) 
Ocean Minerals 
Company (OMCO) 
(11174) 
-----------------------------------------------
AMR 
Source: NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., U.S. DEP'T COM., DEEP SEABED MINING: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATE-
MENT 32 (1981). 
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APPENDIX III 
SUMMARY OF INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE: ~ 
IMPACTS OF DEEP SEABED MINING eo 
00 
01 
Potential Significance of Biological Impact '---' 
Potential Biological Impacts Probability 
Initial Conditions I Physio-Chemical (Remaining Concerns of Recovery Overall 
Disturbance Effects in Capitals) Occurrence Rate Consequence Significance 
Collector °Scour and compact DESTROY BENTHIC FAUNA Certain Unknown3 Adverse Unavoidable' 
sediments IN AND NEAR COLLECTOR (Probably (Uncertain 
TRACK Slow) Sig) 
°Light and Sound Attraction to new food supply; Unlikely Unknown Uncertain None 
possible temporary blindness (Probably t"" 
Rapid) ~ 
Benthic Plume °Increased sedimenta- °EFFECT ON BENTHOS 0 tion rate and in- - Covering of food supply Likely Unknown3 Adverse Unknown5 ~ 
creased suspended (Probably 
matter Slow) ~ 
("rain of fines") :::c: t.:I:j 
- Clogging of respiratory Likely Unknown3 Adverse Unknown' rn 
surface of filter feeders (Probably t.:I:j 
Slow) > 
- Blanketing Certain Unknown3 Adverse Unknowns 
(Probably 
Slow) 
°Increased food supply Unlikely Rapid4 Possibly None 
for benthos Beneficial 
°NutrientflTace Metal ~ace metals uptake by Unlikely Rapid No detectable None 
increase zooplankton effect 
°Oxygen demand °Lower dissolved oxygen for Unlikely Rapid No detectable None C/.:) 
organisms to utilize; effect 0 
mortality from anaerobic eo 
conditions 
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Potential Significance of Biological Impact c,o., 
..... 
Potential Biological Impacts Probability 
0 
Initial Conditions' Physio-Chemical (Remaining Concerns of Recovery Overall 
Disturbance iffects. in Capitals) Occurrence Rate Consequence Significance 
Surface Discharge °Increased suspended °Effect on Zooplankton 
Particulates particulate matter - Mortality Unlikely Rapid' No detectable None tz:j 
(sediments, nodule effect" Z 
fragments and biota <:: 
debris) I-t ~ 
- Change in abundance and/ Unlikely Rapid' No detectable None 0 
or species composition effect" Z a:: 
- Trace metal uptake Unlikely Rapid' Locally Low· tz:j 
Adverse Z 
- Increase food supply due to Unlikely Rapid' Possibly None t-3 > introduction of benthic Beneficial ~ 
biotic debris and elevated 
> . microbial activity due to 
"%j 
increased substrate 
"%j 
°Effect on adult fish Unlikely Rapid' No detectable None ,> I-t 
effect" ~ 
°EFFECT ON FISH LARVAE Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Low' 00 
(Low) (probably 
Rapid) 
"Oxygen Demand °Lower dissolved oxygen for . Unlikely Rapid No detectable None 
organisms to utilize effect" ~ 
°Pynocline accumulation °Effect on primary productivity Unlikely Uncertain Unknown Low ~ 
(Probably (Prob. 
..... 
Rapid) Undetect) t>:) ~ 
°Decreased light due to °Decrease in primary Certain Rapid' Locally Low ~ 
increased turbidity productivity Adverse 
APPENDIX III (Continued) 
Potential Significance of Biological Impact 
Initial Conditions I Physio-Chemical 
Disturbance Effects 
Surface Discharge °Increased nutrients 
Dissolved 
Substances 
°Increase in dissolved 
trace metals 
°Supersaturation in 
dissolved gas content 
Potential Biological Impacts 
(Remaining Concerns 
in Capitals) 
°Increase in primary 
productivity 
°Change in phytoplankton 
species composition or intro-
duce deep-sea microbe or 
spores to surface 
°Inhibition of primary 
productivity 
°Embolism 
1. Include characteristics of the discharge and the mining system. 
2. Based on experiments/measurements conducted under DOMES. 
3. Years to tens of years, or longer. 
4. Days to weeks. 
5. Areas of future research. 
Probability 
of 
Occurrence 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Uncertain = Some knowledge exists; however the validity of extrapolations is tenuous. 
Recovery 
Rate 
Rapid 4 
Rapid' 
Rapid' 
Rapid 
Unknown = Very little or no knowledge exists on the subjects; predictions mostly based on conjecture. 
SPM = Suspended Particulate Matter 
Overall 
Consequence Significance 
No detectable None 
effect' 
No detectable None 
effect' 
No detectable None 
effect" 
No detectable None 
effect" 
Source: NAT'L OcEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD., U.S. DEP'T COM., DEEP SEABED MINING: MARINE ENVTL. RESEARCH PLAN 1981-19854 
(1982). 
